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Abstract
Because non-renewable energy subsidies affect incentives for investing in energy-saving
technologies, they entail a classic investment hold-up problem: once investment has taken
place, policymakers will tend to overuse them for distributional reasons, which will in turn
depress investment by forward-looking agents. Reforming energy subsidies thus requires
overcoming a policy commitment problem. In this paper we show that, even when com-
mitment is feasible, it may fail to materialize in a political equilibrium due to politicians’
re-election incentives. In particular, it will be those politicians who are comparatively less
favorable to energy subsidies who may fail to commit to phase them out.
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Highlights
• We analyze how re-election incentives can shape the choice of energy subsidies.
• Lack of policy commitment on energy subsidies can adversely affect energy-saving
investments.
• Policymakers seeking re-election may choose to forgo commitment on energy subsidies
even when policy commitment is feasible and efficiency-enhancing.
• Incentives for retaining discretion are stronger for political candidates who are ‘mod-
erates’ with respect to their position on energy subsidies.
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1. Introduction
Why are non-renewable energy subsidies so widespread and substantial, given that they
are also a major source of inefficiencies?2 This question has inspired a major, ongoing,
debate among academics and practitioners.
The inefficiencies associated with energy subsidies are well known, and range from waste
and overconsumption3 to the adoption or maintenance of energy-intensive processes, from
delays in the development and introduction of energy-saving, cleaner technologies4 to the
overexploitation nonrenewable resources.5 Energy subsidies also entail large (and not fully
transparent) fiscal costs, encourage smuggling and fraud, and increase pollution and CO2
emissions. Yet, despite persistent calls for reform, and despite the need for a rapid phase-
out of non-renewable energy investments if conservative carbon emission targets are to be
met (Pfeiffer et al., 2016), non-renewable energy subsidies remain popular and widespread,
and attempts to rationalize them have produced mixed and at times disappointing results.6
2The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2011) estimated the total world amount of energy subsidies in
2010 at approximately $410 billion (about 0.6 percent of world GDP, based on IMF estimates of world GDP
at about $64 trillion in 2010: see IMF (2014)). Similarly, Coady et al. (2013) estimated that in 2011 global
subsidies (net of the costs associated with consumption externalities) amounted to $492 billion, equivalent
to 0.7 percent of the world’s GDP. According to MISI (2011), the average annual energy subsidies provided
by the U.S. federal government between 1950 and 2010 amounted to about $14 billion. Figures reported by
Shang et al. (2013) for other countries are in line with these estimates for the U.S., and also indicate that
in at least twenty countries energy subsidies in 2011 may have exceeded five percent of GDP. According to
the UNEP (UNEP, 2011), energy subsidies in 2005 amounted to $40 billion in Russia, and exceeded $10
billion in seven other countries, including China and India. According to the World Bank Independent
Evaluation Group, in 2008 five countries had fuel subsidies equal or larger than five percent of GDP and
nine countries spend more than twice on fuels subsidies than on public health (IEG, 2009). Data reported
in Bauer et al. (2013) confirm this picture and suggest that at least ten countries spent more on energy
subsidies than on public health and education services.
3Other economic costs include price distortions, distributional anomalies – as these subsidies are not
targeted to the poor and end up benefiting mainly the rich – and, for fossil-fuel importers, reduced energy
security: see for instance van Beers and Strand (2013).
4Evidence, however, suggests that private investments in energy-saving technologies are below the levels
implied by a calculation based on economic incentives (Alcott and Greenstone, 2012).
5Perversely, even subsidies targeted at encouraging the use of clean or renewable energy can induce
owners of nonrenewable resources to increase the pace of extraction in response to expectations of lowered
future revenues – the so-called “green paradox” (Sinn, 2008; Sinn, 2012).
6The IEA (IEA, 2011) estimated that, if fossil-fuel consumption subsidies were phased out by 2020,
energy demand growth would decline by four percentage points, oil demand by 3.7 mbd, and growth in
CO2 emissions would be cut by 1.7 Gt. According to Anderson and McKibbin (2000), removing coal
subsidies in OECD and non-OECD countries would reduce global CO2 emissions by eight percent, with
little impact on GDP. Ivanic and Martin (2008) estimated that removal of energy subsidies in the Middle
East and North Africa would raise welfare by $15.3 billion in the region and by $30.4 billion in non-OPEC
1
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The political economy of fuel subsidies is complex and has been discussed from a variety
of angles. A key feature (see, e.g., Commander, 2012) is that subsidies by their nature
generate a redistribution of resources that yields a net gain to low-income consumers of
energy (although these benefits may be lower than frequently assessed, once the costs
associated with pollution and congestion are properly taken into account). It follows that
energy suppliers lobbying for energy subsidies can count on the political support of a large
share of the population, including both voters who directly benefit from them and voters
who do not but care about redistribution.
Policymakers can pursue distributional objectives through a variety of instruments. all
of which are distortionary. Still, subsidizing energy is a very inefficient way of achieving
redistribution, even by comparison to other distortionary instruments – in a second-best
policy mix, distributional objectives should be addressed by more directly targeted in-
struments, such as income taxes, rather than by deviations from Pigouvian taxation. So
why are energy subsidies so persistent? Among other factors (such as political robust-
ness7) one possible explanation rests on the dynamic characteristics of energy use, and the
time-inconsistency problem that arises as a result.
Investment in energy-saving technologies – e.g. more efficient power stations or fuel-
efficient cars – tends to be, to a large extent, irreversible (Fuss et al., 2012). If producers
and users expect energy subsidies to persist, they are discouraged form undertaking invest-
ments. Such investments could be encouraged by credibly announcing a future reduction
of subsidies. However, since reducing subsidies is politically difficult, once the promised re-
duction has produced its intended effect and private agents have undertaken these (largely
irreversible) investments, policymakers would have an incentive to postpone, water down,
or even cancel the reform and leave the subsidies unchanged. Anticipating this behavior,
private agents may not believe the announcement of a future reform in the first place, un-
less its credibility is bolstered by effective institutional arrangements (e.g. reducing future
discretion in setting energy prices by adopting automatic pricing formulas or by delegating
countries outside the region, while reducing it by $2.5 billion in OPEC countries outside the region.
7Energy subsidies are a politically robust mechanism to convey transfers to the “energy-dependent
poor,” because they target basic needs shared by almost all households, such as domestic heating and
transportation, and while their benefits are relatively more important for the poor, the rich also benefit from
them and are thus – often – reluctant to endorse reforms aimed at abolishing or curbing them. According
to Bauer et al. (2013), in low- and middle-income countries on average 43 percent of fuel subsidies accrue
to the richest twenty percent of households, and only seven percent to the poorest 20 percent (similar
estimates, for Africa and other regions, are found in Clements et al. (2010) and in IEA (2011)). However,
the ratio of energy subsidies to income or consumption is larger for the poor. For instance, a 2004 study
for Bolivia found that hydrocarbon subsidies were important for the poor, despite substantial leakages to
richer households (IEG, 2009). For a discussion of distributional effects of gasoline taxes for the US, see
Bento et al. (2009).
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the task to an independent special committee).8 In practice, such institutional measures
are rarely implemented in a way that makes them effective, suggesting that there may be
some political reluctance to enter into such an institutional commitment.
In this paper, we look at the interplay of energy policy with other policy objectives to
explain why policymakers may wish to forgo reform in order to retain an inefficient margin
of discretion in energy policy. We frame our model in a stylized description of representative
democracy whereby the citizens elect public representatives (“policymakers”) who decide
both on the level (and reform) of energy subsidies and on various other issues of public
policy. We show that, under certain conditions, an incumbent policymaker may deliberately
refrain from reforming energy subsidies in order to secure re-election, and that this may
also occur in an indefinite sequence of repeated electoral contests.9
We start our discussion by formalizing the policy commitment problem that confronts
an incumbent policymaker in relation to the choice of energy subsidies. We then examine
under what conditions policymakers may decline, in equilibrium, to make a credible com-
mitment to reducing subsidies even when they have the technical and institutional capacity
to do so. For this purpose, we develop a two-period model of political competition with
multidimensional policy choices, where policymakers elected in the first period have the op-
tion of making their announcements of future reforms fully credible by adopting a specific
institutional arrangement that places a binding constraint on future subsidies. We then use
this model to investigate whether such commitment mechanisms may remain deliberately
unexploited, resulting in a failure to engage in reform.
In our model, the time-inconsistency of the optimal choice along the policy dimension of
energy subsidies plays in favor of restricting the discretionary power of second-period poli-
cymakers. Such restrictions, however, transform the electoral game by effectively removing
one policy dimension (energy) from the agenda, to the disadvantage of candidates that
have an electoral comparative advantage in that area. Anticipating this effect, incumbents
may choose not to undertake a credible commitment to reform energy subsidies, preferring
to retain inefficient discretionary control of energy subsidies in order to retain an electoral
advantage.
8This type of policy commitment problem has been extensively studied with reference to other policy
dimensions – such as tax policy and monetary policy – although it has received comparatively less attention
in the energy and environmental management literature; exceptions are Marsiliani and Renstro¨m (2000),
and Abrego and Perroni (2002).
9We abstract from other factors that are relevant for the decision of whether or not to retain discretion
in energy policy, most notably the uncertainty associated with the medium-term volatility of energy prices.
Our aim is to explain why energy subsidy reform may fail to materialize in situations where it would be
an economically efficient course of action. If the need to respond to unforeseeable shocks makes retaining
discretion economically efficient on balance, then there is no puzzle to be explained.
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This strategic non-commitment behavior on the part of elected policymakers will be
anticipated by voters and will be reflected in their voting choices. Nevertheless, in certain
circumstances, voters may choose to accommodate this strategy by electing a policymakers
that they anticipate would behave in this way – because doing so can secure a policy mix
that they still favor in comparison to that which could be offered by candidates who would
be willing to commit.
Our arguments are developed with reference to the case of an established representative
democracy, but similar considerations might apply to nondemocratic regimes in which an
autocrat depends on the support of a number of diverse, well identified constituencies.10
We also briefly discuss the role that could be played by some institutional measures
that could, in principle, facilitate the adoption of a credible commitment, or remove the
inefficiencies inherent in across-the-board subsidies that are granted to all users, namely,
automatic pricing formulas, independent price-setting committees, subsidies on energy-
saving investment, and targeted transfers. We analyze how these measures would alter the
structure of the game and briefly examine the considerations of political economy that can
explain why they are not frequently implemented and why the practical experience with
their application has not always been fully satisfactory.
Our analysis of policymakers’ commitment choices is related to earlier studies of the
relationship between long-term policy choices and political equilibrium in a democracy
(Persson and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Milesi-
Ferretti and Spolaore, 1994; Milesi-Ferretti, 1994, Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Anesi, 2006). The
political game that we formalize bears methodological similarities with the model of Besley
and Coate (1998), who, however, focus on a situation where a current policy decision
affects the preferences and welfare of the citizens in the future and no problem of policy
commitment arises. Our study, instead, specifically focuses on the issue of the credibility
of long-term policy targets, and on how the commitment to a policy target is determined
in political equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the policy commitment prob-
lem. Section 3 examines the commitment incentives facing political competitors. Section
4 provides a brief discussion of some alternative institutional arrangements and their im-
plications in the present setting; and Section 5 concludes. Proofs of results are given in
Appendix A, while Appendix B discusses an extension of the model in which energy con-
sumption needs are correlated with income.
10van Beers and Strand (2013) have shown empirically that, compared with established democracies, non-
democracies tend to have higher fuel subsidies while, among democracies, countries where the president is
elected directly by the people or where elections are based on a plurality system tend to have comparatively
lower subsidies. While we do not consider this question here, the mechanisms we discuss may also have
implications for that debate.
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2. Energy subsidies and the commitment to reform
In this section we describe the policy commitment problem that is associated with the
reform of energy subsidies.
Consider an economy composed of a population of unit mass. Each individual has
income m ∈ [m,m] ≡ M and exogenous energy (fossil fuel) consumption needs equal to
i ∈ I ≡ [0, 1]. Such heterogeneity could reflect, for example, heterogeneity in residential
patterns, which in turn would translate into heterogeneity with respect to individuals’
reliance on private forms of transportation. A high i here reflects a higher “need”, and a
high level of energy consumption does not translate into higher welfare but rather reduces
the level of disposable income that is available for the consumption of other goods. We
assume that i is uniformly distributed in I. For simplicity, we also assume that i and m
are uncorrelated (i.e. independently distributed) in the population – in Appendix B we
present an extension where, more realistically, they are positively correlated, and show that
this does not alter our key conclusions.11 Hereafter, the couple (i,m) that represents an
individual’s exogenously given energy consumption needs and income, will be referred to
as a that individual’s “type.”
The producer price of energy, gross of any subsidy, is unity. The consumer price of
energy is p, which equals unity in the absence of any subsidies and is reduced to p = 1− s
if energy products are subsidized at some rate s ∈ [0, 1).12 Energy use is purely a cost
for individuals, i.e. individuals only derive utility from consumption of non-energy goods
(hereafter called “consumer goods”).
The total financial cost of the subsidies, F , is paid by the government by raising a
uniform, lump-sum levy on all taxpayers.13 Owing to various inefficiencies and distortions,
the total actual costs directly or indirectly incurred by the taxpayers, T (F ), (comprising the
11We also assume that energy consumption needs are independent of the price of energy – in other
words, that energy demand is completely price inelastic. In fact, the short-term price elasticity of energy
consumption is generally rather low.
12The subsidies we represent in this model by s could take many forms, including direct consumer price
subsidies and production subsidies that are fully transferred to the consumers. We only consider the
possibility of non-negative subsidies: although some governments actually tax energy products in order
to encourage the adoption of energy-saving technology and habits, the effects of positive and negative
subsidies can be asymmetric (for instance, while the collection of taxes to finance positive subsidies entails
a deadweight loss, any distribution to taxpayers of the amount collected through negative subsidies would
not produce any deadweight gains). For simplicity and with little loss of generality, we restrict our attention
to non-negative subsidies, but our general arguments carries over to the case of energy taxation. In
the closed-economy context we examine here, subsidies on energy use are fully equivalent to production
subsidies.
13This simplifying assumption is also relaxed in Appendix B, where the levy is assumed to be proportional
to income.
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net amount used to pay the subsidies, administrative costs, and other deadweight losses)
is larger than the financial costs of the subsidies themselves, and the difference due to the
inefficiencies and distortions increases with the size of the subsidies. Formally, it is assumed
that T (0) = 0, T ′(F ) ≥ 1 and T ′′(F ) > 0.
Before consuming energy, individuals can make investments that reduce their future
energy consumption needs from i to (1−a) i (for example, individuals can choose cars that
are more expensive to buy but are more fuel efficient). We assume that the cost of this
investment per unit of energy requirement is a continuous, thrice differentiable and convex
function of a, with the usual properties c(0) = 0, c′(a) ≥ 0, c′′(a) > 0, c′(0) = 0, c′(1) > 1;
i.e. no costs are incurred if no investment takes place; costs increase with the size of the
investment, and they do so at a rate that increases from zero when a = 0 to a level that lies
above unity for a = 1.14 It is further assumed — for reasons that will become clear later –
that c′′′(0) ≥ 0 (the third derivative of investment costs with respect to investment size is
non-negative; in other words, the rate of increase of marginal costs does not decrease with
the size of the investment).
Given the energy-saving investment made by the consumers (which, as shown below, is
the same for all consumers in this setting), total energy consumption (in physical units) is
E(a) =
∫ 1
0
(1− a) i di =
1− a
2
, (1)
and the total financial cost for the government of the subsidies actually paid to all consumers
is equal to
F (s, a) = sE(a) = s
1− a
2
. (2)
Since the mass of individuals is unity, the per capita cost of delivering the subsidy, which
comprises the levy plus any other losses due to distortions, equals T
(
F (s, a)
)
(hereafter
called “the tax”). Thus, the disposable income of an individual with energy requirement i
and income m, net of the tax, of the cost of energy-saving investment, and of energy costs
(net of subsidies), equals
y(s, a; i,m) = m− T
(
F (s, a)
)
−
(
c(a) + (1− a)(1− s)
)
i. (3)
This is the amount that each citizen can spend on consumer goods and coincides, here,
with the individual’s purely private level of utility.
Individuals do not care only about their own private utility, but also about the wel-
fare of the other members of society, and most notably that of less privileged individuals.
14This latter condition implies that a is always less than one: a hypothetical investment that reduced
energy consumption needs to zero is never economically viable.
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These altruistic concerns are captured by a Rawlsian welfare function W
(
y(s, a; i,m), i ∈
I, m ∈ M
)
= min i,m y(s, a; i,m) = y(s, a; 1,m) (since y(s, a; i,m) is increasing in m and
decreasing in i); in other words, social welfare coincides with the utility of the least well-off
individual, who is the individual with the lowest income, m = m, and with the highest
energy requirement, i = i = 1. Each individual’s overall utility, g(s, a; i,m), is thus equal
to a weighted average of her own disposable income, y(s, a; i,m), and of the Rawlsian wel-
fare level y(s, a; 1,m), according to some weight ω which we assume to be the same for all
citizens:15
g(s, a; i,m) = ω y(s, a; i,m) + (1− ω) y(s, a; 1,m)
= ωm+ (1− ω)m− T
(
F (s, a)
)
−
(
c(a) + (1− a)(1− s)
)
ρ(i). (4)
where ρ(i) ≡ (1− ω) i+ ωi = (1− ω) i+ ω.
Consumers choose how much to invest in energy-saving technologies on the basis of the
level of subsidies they expect. Each individual consumer chooses the amount of investment
that minimizes her total expected energy-related costs (investment costs plus energy costs)
given the expected retail price of energy (net of subsidies); this is given by the value of a
for which the marginal cost of investment is equal to the expected retail energy price, i.e.
such that c′(a) = p = 1 − s, implying a choice a = θ(p) ≡ (c′)−1(p) = (c′)−1(1 − s) per
unit of energy use, where (c′)−1(p) is the inverse of the first derivative of c(.).16 Since θ(p)
does not depend on the consumer’s type (i,m), all consumers make the same energy-saving
investment per unit of energy requirement – on the basis of the expected level of s. The
total cost of this investment for a consumer with energy requirement i is thus equal to
c
(
θ(p)
)
i.17
Suppose now that citizens appoint, through democratic elections, a citizen of type
(i,m) as the officer charged to select a rate of subsidy (the “policymaker”), and that
this rate is publicly announced and committed to before consumers make their investment
decisions; and suppose that the appointed citizen makes her choice according to her own
preferences, i.e. in order to maximize her overall utility g(s, a; i,m), which depends on
15Differences in citizens’ preferences about the optimal level of subsidies are thus not determined by
differences in the intensity of their concerns for the welfare of the poor, but only by the difference in their
own private energy consumption needs. Incorporating such differences in attitudes in the model would not
yield major gains in terms of generality.
16Given our earlier assumptions, θ(p) has the following properties: θ(0) = 0; θ′ = 1/c′′ > 0; θ′′ =
−c′′′/(c′′)2 ≤ 0.
17In this model, the “energy efficiency gap,” whereby citizens underinvest in the energy-saving technol-
ogy, arises from the negative externalities associated with energy consumption and is aggravated by the
expectation that energy will continue to be subsidized in the future. The energy efficiency gap can also
arise from other sources, such as imperfect information (see, e.g., Alcott and Greenstone (2012).
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her type, (i,m).18 Anticipating the citizens’ investment response, the policymaker will
incorporate in her decision how the subsidy affects a, i.e. she will choose a rate of subsidy
that maximizes her ex-ante utility
g
(
s, θ(1− s); i,m
)
= ωm+ (1− ω)m− T
(
F
(
s, θ(1− s)
))
−
(
c
(
θ(1− s)
)
+
(
1− θ(1− s)
)
(1− s)
)
ρ(i). (5)
The first-order condition for an interior optimum with s > 0 can be written (after simpli-
fication, and omitting arguments of functions) as
(1− θ)
(
2ρ/T ′ − 1
)
c′′ − s ≡ Φ = 0.19 (6)
Alternatively, the optimummay be at a corner with s = 0.20 For simplicity, in the discussion
that follows we shall assume that ω is large enough that the optimum is an interior optimum
identified by (6), i.e. that ω > ω ≡ T ′(0)/2, the latter value being identified by the condition
ρ(0)/T ′(0) = 1/2. As (6) is independent of m, we can express the ex-ante preferred
subsidy as a function, sEA(i), of i alone. This ex-ante preferred subsidy is increasing
in i: the derivative dsEA(i)/di equals −Φi/Φs, where subscripts denote partial derivatives;
the expression Φi is positive, and Φs must be negative if (5) identifies an interior optimum
(the maximand must be concave).
If, on the other hand, the same individual is appointed to select a subsidy level ex post,
i.e. after investment choices have been made, then the policymaker would take a as given
and set the subsidy rate at the level that maximizes her own ex-post utility
g(s, a; i,m) = ωm+ (1− ω)m− T
(
F (s, a)
)
−
(
c(a) + (1− a)(1− s)
)
ρ(i). (7)
Differentiating the above with respect to s (and bearing in mind that a is now given) yields
the first-order condition
2 ρ(i)− T ′ = 0. (8)
18This is in line with citizen-candidate models of political competition, as first developed by Osborne and
Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Such behavior does not necessarily imply disregard of the
public interest: first, public interest is already accounted for in the Rawlsian component of overall utility;
in addition, a policymaker’s perception and assessment of the needs of other citizens may be shaped by the
same factors that enter her utility function even if the policymaker is fully benevolent. Note, too, that the
policymaker’s personal preferences, like those of all other citizens (elected and non-elected), incorporate a
concern for the welfare of the least well off individual.
20This assumes that subsidies are constrained to be non-negative. The model can be extended to include
the possibility of negative subsidies, equivalent to a tax on energy products, as is enforced in many advanced
economies. This modification would yield qualitatively similar results, with no major gains in generality.
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For ω ≥ ω ≡ T ′(0)/2 (the minimum value of ω that ensures an interior ex-ante optimal
choice of s) this identifies an interior ex-post optimal subsidy rate s˜EP (a; i), conditional
on a given level of a, for all i ∈ [0, 1]. This rate is increasing in i – the total derivative is
ds˜EP (a; i)/di = 4ρ
′/
(
(1− a)T ′′
)
, which is positive for a < 1.
In a perfect-foresight equilibrium where all citizens (including the policymaker) antic-
ipate the subsidy level that will be selected, we must have a = θ(s˜EP (a; i)), which, in
conjunction with (8), identifies an equilibrium ex-post level of subsidy, sEP (i).
21
Moreover, it can be shown that sEP (i) exceeds sEA(i):
Proposition 1. For any given policymaker whose energy requirement, i, is such that
ρ(i) ≥ 1/2, the ex-post optimal subsidy sEP (i) is greater than (or equal to) the ex-ante
optimal subsidy sEA(i), with equality holding only if ρ(i) = 1/2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Ex post – after investments have been made – the policymaker does not need to worry
about the (adverse) effects of the subsidy on energy-saving investment, and so the dis-
tributional objectives will carry a comparatively greater weight in her decision problem,
implying that the subsidy that is chosen ex post is higher than the subsidy that would
have been chosen ex ante by the same policymaker. Hence, if the policymaker is unable to
commit to the announced level of subsidy, the citizens anticipate that, after investments
have been made, she will set the subsidies at her own preferred ex-post level, and make
their ex-ante investment decisions accordingly. Lack of a credible commitment to a specific
level of subsidies thus makes the policymaker unable to implement her preferred, lower,
and (for her, at least) more efficient ex-ante level.
It should be stressed that the commitment problem we describe does not hinge on
the specific structure of the distributional problem as we have characterized it. Indeed
the argument does not depend on what the distributional objectives of policymakers are,
and would equally apply, for example, to scenarios where subsidies to energy production
are aimed at boosting rents for industry stakeholders (energy producers and distributors,
e.g. electricity companies) – as would be implied by a model of lobbying, such as that
of Grossman and Helpman (1994). The general point here is that, no matter what the
distributional concerns are, those concerns will be traded off ex ante with the adverse
efficiency effects of subsidies on investment choices, but ex post those effects disappear,
inefficiently raising the ex-post subsidy choice above the corresponding ex-ante choice.
21A necessary condition for this equilibrium to be stable is that dsEP (i)/da < 1 at the fixed point; this
in turn requires sθ′/θ < 1.
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This commitment problem can arise even in the absence of any environmental costs (which
would of course make the problem more serious).
In principle, this problem could be solved by introducing institutional devices that
enable the policymaker to make a credible commitment to implement a specific level of
subsidies, for instance, by delegating the authority to set the retail price of energy to an
independent technical committee with a narrow policy mandate. In monetary matters, for
example, some countries delegate the setting of central banks’ interest rates to independent
monetary policy committees, tasked to pursue specific targets that relate to inflation and
to the operation of financial markets, to the exclusion of other policy objectives. There are
also indications that policymakers have identified a need for policy delegation in the area
of energy subsidies. In their efforts to reduce, or contain, fuel subsidies, many countries
have adopted automatic mechanism that regularly update administrative fuel prices ac-
cording to a pre-set formula aimed at ensuring that changes in (international) input prices
are fully passed through to the consumer, after allowing for domestic storage and distri-
bution costs and a reasonable profit margin. These mechanisms, frequently administered
by special price-setting committees, have been implemented with good results in a number
of countries; but in several cases they have been (either formally or effectively) abandoned
following sharp increases in international prices. According to Coady et al. (2012), this
fragility “in part reflects the reluctance of governments to fully pass through large price
increases that they believe may be temporary and could cause a social and political back-
lash.” The fact that these schemes could be abandoned at the very moment when their
independent role would have been most significant suggests that they were not an effective
commitment device, i.e. that they were set up with inadequate protections from political
pressures or from influence by special interest groups.
So, why do we not see robust policy delegation mechanisms being adopted more widely
and effectively?
3. Policy reform and re-election incentives
The question we address here – and which the rest of our paper is concerned with – is
whether a commitment to reform energy subsidies may fail to materialize in a political-
economy equilibrium where elected policymakers must trade off the advantages of com-
mitment against re-election concerns. To develop our arguments, we focus on a simplified
multidimensional policy framework, where energy subsidies are selected by policymakers
jointly with other policy issues.22
22We cast our analysis in the context of a political-economy model of pure representative democracy. As
we noted earlier, analogous incentives can arise in a setting where political support is shaped by lobbying
from special interest groups, such as energy industry stakeholders.
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The literature on the political economy of policy commitment choices has pointed out
that an incumbent may choose strategically to deviate from the efficient level of commit-
ment in order to influence the outcome of future elections. This deviation can take the form
of an excessive degree of commitment to future policy choices in response to dynamically-
inconsistent behavior on the part of voters, an issue discussed by Persson and Svensson
(1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), and Anesi (2006): since voters cannot commit to re-
elect the incumbent (or to elect any other candidates who support specific policy choices),
the incumbent can attempt to constrain future policymakers to specific choices that they,
and the majority that will elect them, may not favor. Thus, strategically motivated policy
choices by the incumbent can impose inefficiently strong constraints (“too much reform”)
over future policy choices. However, the opposite phenomenon – an inefficiently low degree
of commitment – could be observed for analogous reasons: commitment may be forgone
by an incumbent if it adversely affects her relative standing in future elections, a point
made by Milesi-Ferretti (1995) with reference to the choice between different exchange-
rate systems.23 Thus, dynamic inconsistency in policy choices could arise as the result of
dynamically inconsistent voting choices.
A question naturally arising from the above argument is whether such behavior would
ever be observed in equilibrium. With repeated elections, if voters anticipate that a certain
candidate will decide strategically not to commit if elected, such a candidate may never
be elected in the first place. In other words, strategic non-commitment on the part of
the incumbent may only be a relevant choice “off the equilibrium path”. Furthermore,
if strategic non-commitment by elected candidates in anticipation of future elections is
undesirable to a majority of citizens, then the same majority may be able to bring about a
change in the political system which reduces the scope for such behavior. Yet, we observe
that policymakers are de facto given the option to retain discretionary control over policy
instruments even when means of credible commitment are in fact available.
To look at this question we examine a model where elected candidates make decisions
along two distinct policy dimensions. For the first of these – setting the rate of energy subsi-
dies – the optimal choice of policy is not credible unless it is supported by pre-commitment,
but institutional arrangements exist that would enable an incumbent government to credi-
bly commit to any target. Voting decisions and political equilibria are modelled here along
the lines of the “citizen-candidate” approach developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996)
and Besley and Coate (1997), whereby individual citizens vote for candidates, drawn among
23This possibility is also mentioned in Persson and Svensson (1989). The strategic manipulation of a
state variable by an incumbent in order to alter her relative popularity has also been addressed by Aghion
and Bolton (1990) and Milesi-Ferretti (1994); others, like Anesi (2006), have focused on the incumbents’
incentive to constrain the set of choices of their successors in a context where commitment – rather than
non-commitment – produces an inefficient outcome.
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the citizens themselves, who are expected, once elected, to make policy choices that are
in line with their own (known) preferences. Unlike in the pure citizen-candidate model,
however, we model the political system simply as a (hypothetically infinite) sequence of
pairwise majority voting contests; in other words, among the set of eligible candidates, the
one who is actually elected is assumed to be the candidate who cannot be defeated by any
other candidate in a pairwise contest.24
3.1. Policy preferences and the political system
Consider a two-period economy (t = 0, 1) with two policy choices in period 1, s (the energy
subsidy) and a choice x along a policy dimension completely unrelated to energy policies
– say, education. Commitment to reform along policy dimension s can be made in period
t = 0 by setting a ceiling s0 on the energy subsidy rate s that can be granted in period
t = 1; it is assumed that, under existing institutional arrangements, this constraint is
always enforced if it is introduced. No commitment is feasible or desirable with respect to
x.25
There is a continuum of voters, each identified by a two-dimensional vector v ≡ (i, j) –
which denotes the voter’s “type” and determines her policy preferences along the two policy
dimensions – and uniformly distributed over a square support of unit side V ≡ {(i, j) | i, j ∈
[0, 1]}. All voters live for two periods, and their preferences over policies are assumed to
be intertemporally separable, with preferences for first-period policies summarized by
u(s, x; i, j) ≡ g
(
s, θ(s); i,m
)
+ h(x; j), (9)
where g
(
s, θ(s); i,m
)
is as defined in the previous section, and
h(x; j) ≡ −η(x− j)2, (10)
with the latter being maximized for a voter of type (i, j) by a policy choice x = j. Quadratic
utility functions are frequently used in economic models of political equilibrium (e.g., Cre-
mer and Palfrey (1996), because they ensure that voters’ preferences are single-peaked,
i.e. voters have an ideal policy and their payoffs are monotonically decreasing as the pol-
icy deviates from this ideal policy in either direction. In turn this implies that the final
outcome of a pairwise majority ballot between two policy choices is determined by the
24This simplifying assumption weakens the requirements that ensure the existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium, and rules out any strategic behavior on the part of both candidates (concerning entry) and
voters.
25This could be because of institutional reasons, or because flexibility is required. For example, suppose
that the economy can experience a shock ε at t = 1, having zero mean and known variance, which causes
a certain policy choice x to have the same effect as a choice x+ ε. Then, if the variance of ε is sufficiently
large, it will never be desirable to commit to a given level of x.
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preferences of a pivotal voter at the centre of the voters’ distribution – the median citizen
– thus ensuring the existence of a voting equilibrium under fairly general conditions. The
curvature assumptions we have made in the previous section ensure that single-peakedness
also applies with respect to the s policy dimension.
Policy choices are made by elected policymakers, who cannot pre-commit to a certain
policy action before they are elected. Individual citizens vote over candidates through a
sequence of pairwise ballots, and the elected candidates set their own preferred policies
without regard to any pre-electoral promises or to the preferences of the other citizens
(except insofar as they are internalized in their own utility function, as discussed in the
previous section). In this framework policymakers do not derive any direct utility from
holding office, and only favor being elected insofar as this enables them to implement their
favored policies.
3.2. Commitment choices in a two-candidate contest
In the following, we shall focus on a stylized scenario involving a sequence of four actions:
(i) in period t = 0 an incumbent, who has been elected beforehand, must choose whether or
not to make a binding commitment to a policy s0 that will fully constrain the choice of s in
period t = 1; (ii) at the end of period t = 0, after having observed the commitment choice,
consumers decide how much to invest in energy saving technologies; (iii) at the beginning
of period t = 1, voters elect a policymaker amongst a set of eligible candidates; (iv) the
newly elected policymaker selects a combination of policies (s, x) for for period t = 1, with
her choice of s being constrained to equal s0 if the period-0 incumbent chose to commit to
that level in period t = 0. No further elections or policy choices take place after t = 1 (we
will later briefly discuss a scenario where there is an indefinite sequence of elections and
policy choices). Note that any policy choices made by the incumbent at t = 0 with respect
to period-0 policies can be separated out from the problem, as they do not affect period-1
elections, period-1 choices, nor the policy commitment choice made by the incumbent at
t = 0 with respect to period-1 policies.
We will restrict attention to a scenario with only two candidates, A and B, one of which
is the incumbent policymaker, and having policy preferences such that: (C1) jA ≤ jB ≤ 1/2
– meaning that candidate B is closer to the median voter’s preference type with respect to
policy x; (C2) iB ≥ 1/2 – meaning that the ex-ante preferred subsidy levels of candidate
B is (weakly) greater than that favored by the median voter, and consequently the ex-post
subsidy choice of candidate B is strictly above the ex-ante choice favored by the median
voter (which implies that, if iA < iB, a majority of voters prefer the ex-post subsidy choice
of candidate A to that of candidate B); (C3) iB is sufficiently high that, ex ante, the
median voter prefers a subsidy s = 0 to the ex-post subsidy choice of candidate B, i.e. the
set IA(iB) contains the point iA = 0; (C4) iA ∈ IA(iB).
We can then establish the following result:
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Proposition 2.
I. If candidate B is the incumbent, she will always commit and be re-elected;
II. If candidate A is the incumbent, there exists a non-empty subset, Z, of candidate
types (iA, jA), with iA < iB and jA ≤ jB, such that, if the incumbent’s type belongs to
this set, the incumbent will choose not to commit and will be re-elected.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Assumption (C1) directly implies that if there is policy commitment candidate B is
elected. In turn this means that if candidate B is the incumbent, she will always choose to
commit to her ex-ante favored level of s; by doing so, she will be re-elected and obtain her
ideal policy combination
(
s = sEA(iB), x = jB
)
.
The second part of Proposition 2 – which is our main result – is best illustrated with the
help of an example. Let iB = jB = 1/2, η = 1/5, and let g(s, a; i,m) be defined as in the
example discussed in Section 2. The relevant regions described in the Proof of Proposition
2 are shown in Figure 1. The monotonically decreasing curve in the diagram (labeled as
NN ′) represents the locus of points (iA, jA) (i.e., the set of candidate A’s types) for which
candidate A is indifferent between committing but losing the elections and not committing
and winning the elections. Points below that curve represent the types of candidate A
that would be willing to forgo commitment if this ensured their own re-election. The
non-monotonic (U-shaped) curve in the diagram (labeled as V V ′) represents the locus
of points (iA, jA) for which the two candidates receive the same number of votes under
non-commitment; points above that curve represent candidate A types who could defeat
candidate B in an election by refraining from committing to a given level of subsidies. The
darker shaded area in the figure thus represents the set of candidate-A types who can be re-
elected by choosing non-commitment and choose not to commit. The unshaded area below
the U-shaped curve (V V ′) identifies candidate A types who can never defeat candidate B,
and therefore choose to commit because, ceteris paribus, this is the most efficient decision;
whereas the lighter shaded area above the monotonically decreasing curve (NN ′) identifies
candidate A types who could be re-elected if they chose not to commit, but prefer to commit
even at the cost of losing the next election.26 Thus, in the model the incumbent’s choice
of whether or not to commit is not taken with the sole objective of maximizing electoral
support, but involves a forward-looking comparison of payoffs under each alternative.
26Note that condition (C3), which we imposed at the outset, is sufficient but not necessary for non-
commitment to be possible; i.e. non-commitment can also happen if (C3) is not satisfied. With reference
to Figure 1, even if locus V V ′ (the U-shaped curve) does not cross the vertical axis at a point lying below
jA = 1/2, it is still possible for the two loci to cross and for the non-commitment region to be non-empty.
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Incumbent A would be
re-elected under non-commitment
but prefers to commit and lose
Incumbent A does not commit
and is re-elected
Incumbent A loses with
or without commitment
and chooses to commit
 
 !
"
"!
1/4 1/2
 #
1/4
1/2
!#
Figure 1: Equilibrium non-commitment outcomes by incumbent type when A is the incumbent
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Non-commitment can occur in political equilibrium because committing to future poli-
cies means removing one of the policy dimensions that determine voters’ preferences amongst
competing political candidates. A candidate whose views are comparatively popular on the
policy dimension requiring commitment but comparative unpopular along other, unrelated
policy dimensions, may therefore forgo policy commitment in order to keep on the agenda
the dimension on which she enjoys a comparative electoral advantage, because this would
enhance her chances of winning the next election. In other words, locking in policy measures
through policy reform along a certain policy dimension knocks out a politically convenient
“talking point” for those candidates who are comparatively strong along that dimension
and comparatively weaker along others. Such candidates, precisely because they are polit-
ically strong along the policy dimension requiring reform, may find it politically expedient
to forgo reform.
For this option to be attractive to the incumbent, however, her preferences along the
other policy dimensions must be sufficiently different from those of her challenger to make
incurring the cost of non-commitment worthwhile; and for this option to be viable, the
incumbent must be sufficiently strong in political terms along the other policy dimensions
to make re-election possible under non-commitment. This outcome therefore can only occur
if the incumbent is a “moderate” candidate – reasonably (but not “extremely”) disciplined
with respect to the use energy subsidies, and having, on the other policy dimensions, a
position that is sufficiently different from that of the challenger (and of most of the other
citizens) to justify her efforts to remain in power, but not so different to hamper her
possibility of re-election.
The preceding discussion has abstracted from candidacy choices. Absent candidacy
costs, and with a single candidate challenging the incumbent, standing for election is always
a weakly undominated strategy for both contestants. Moreover, any positive probability
of winning, no matter how small, would make standing a dominant strategy.27 The same
conclusion applies if there are positive candidacy costs, as long as they are not too large.
3.3. Non-commitment under repeated elections
The above analysis abstracts from the long-run political calculations that arise under
repeated elections (an indefinite sequence of two-candidate contests) – namely, that both
27To see this, suppose that, given two potentially competing candidates A and B, with probability ξ, the
ideal points of voters undergo a systematic displacement in a direction that favors candidate A and that
is large enough to deliver a win for A, and with probability 1− ξ they undergo a systematic displacement
in a direction that favors candidate B and that is large enough to deliver a win for B. Then, as ξ → 0,
political uncertainty has a negligible effect on policymakers’ expected payoff from commitment, and thus
commitment choices are as we have characterized them; but as long as ξ is not exactly zero, standing for
election remains a dominant strategy for both candidates.
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forward-looking voters and candidates would account for the fact that, once elected, a
candidate of a certain type may be able to secure re-election indefinitely. It can nevertheless
be shown that non-commitment can arise in equilibrium under repeated voting:
Proposition 3. If, in addition to the above conditions, individuals sufficiently discount
future payoffs, non-commitment can arise in equilibrium under repeated elections.
Proof: See Appendix A.
As shown in the proof, two equilibria are possible, one in which candidate A does not
constrain the value of s and is re-elected indefinitely, and the other in which candidate
B, elected once, sets s = s1 and is then re-elected indefinitely. Under certain conditions
(discussed in the proof), a majority of citizens would be better off in the long term in the
second equilibrium, but transitioning from the first to the second outcome is overly costly
for them in the short term. When Candidate B is elected for the first time, her choice of
subsidy is unconstrained (since Candidate A chooses not to constrain A in the equilibrium
under consideration). If the rate at which voters discount future payoffs is sufficiently high,
then for a majority of voters Candidate B’s subsidy choice during the transition imposes
a short-run cost on them that is too large in comparison with the long-term gain that
they would experience after transitioning to Candidate B, and so voters are “stuck” in
the sub-optimal outcome (which is therefore an equilibrium). Other things equal, this is
comparatively more likely to occur the longer the period of tenure of elected policymakers
– which is homologous to citizens discounting future payoffs at a higher rate.
4. Options for reform
The above discussion has highlighted how a desirable reform of energy subsidies can be
hampered by policymakers’ strategic efforts to enhance their re-election prospects, when
the adverse impact of energy subsidies on private incentives to undertake energy-saving
investments results in a classic time-inconsistency problem.
When this problem is a key obstacle to reform, how can it be overcome? We discuss here
a number of policy options that have been considered (and, in some instances, applied) with
the purpose of facilitating the reform of inefficient energy subsidies: (a) the adoption of
automatic pricing formulas; (b) the delegation of authority to an independent price-setting
committee; (c) the subsidization of energy-saving investments, and (d) the replacement of
universal subsidies with more narrowly targeted direct transfers.
Our preceding analysis offers a specific, political economy-based interpretation of the
obstacles to reform, and a specific lens through which these various policy alternatives can
be assessed.
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Automatic pricing formulas
One measure that has been implemented, with varied success, in some countries, is the
adoption of automatic mechanisms whereby the administered retail prices of selected en-
ergy products are no longer set by discretionary decisions but are periodically adjusted on
the basis of a fixed pre-determined formula. The underlying idea is that, while changes in
the cost of inputs require periodic adjustments to the administrative retail prices, the rate
of subsidies implicit in the difference between the retail price and the total cost of inputs
should not be subject to the short-term discretion of public officials and elected policymak-
ers, and hence to short-term political pressures, but should reflect more sound long-term
considerations. Pre-determined formulas can incorporate a “smoothing mechanism” aimed
at reducing the volatility of retail prices (absorbing the high-frequency changes in the cost
of some inputs into the public budget or into a dedicated stabilization fund).
In principle, these formulas provide an institutional instrument for credibly committing
to a specific subsidy rate: for instance, a formula could prescribe that gasoline be sold to
consumers at a discount of, say, 10% on the wholesale price of imported gasoline (gross of
transportation and storage costs as and of a “normal” operating margin). The subsidy rate
would thus be fixed at 10%, and protected from short-term discretionary changes.
Adopting such a formula would be equivalent, in our model, to the incumbent pol-
icymaker committing to a given subsidy rate for the subsequent period, that any poli-
cymaker elected in that period would be unable to alter. The formula would solve the
time-inconsistency problem (allowing the incumbent to set the subsidy rate at his ex-ante
preferred level), but would only be adopted if the incumbent is willing to undertake such a
commitment, which – as discussed above – may not always be the case.28
Price setting committees
Delegating the determination of subsidy levels to an independent committee can serve
different purposes, depending on the powers, composition, and tenure of the committee.
One possible arrangement involves delegating the authority to modify the subsidies to a
long-standing technical committee composed of experts with specific views on the topic,
who would – ex post – prefer to enforce the rate that the policymaking authority appointing
them would set ex ante (a process that is analogous to the delegation of the authority to set
monetary policy to a ‘conservative’ central banker: see Rogoff (1985). To the extent that the
delegation decision is left to elected policymakers, however, our previous analysis suggests
28In practice, if political pressure to adopt such a formula is strong, the incumbent could formally
introduce it but refrain from adopting effective provisions to ensure its enforcement. The experience of
some countries shows, for instance, that these formulas are not always applied rigorously, especially when
increases in international prices would require a corresponding increase in domestic retail prices (Clements
et al., 2013).
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that they may choose not take advantage of this option if doing so weakens their re-election
prospects. Alternatively it may be possible to rely on a stronger, “constitutional” arrange-
ment whereby policy-making authority on energy matters is transferred to a separate group
of representatives, appointed through various mechanisms by citizens’ organizations and
professional groups, an arrangement that would be equivalent to splitting decision making
powers while still maintaining political representation in each policy dimension. This in-
stitutional arrangement would remove the incentives for non-commitment associated with
the strive for re-election, but it would not solve the underlying time-inconsistency problem
in policy making: if the preferences of committee members are representative of those of
the voters (rather than being more “conservative” than those of voters), the members of
the committee, and the committee itself, would, ex post, select above-optimal subsidies.
Subsidization of energy-saving investment
If reforming energy subsidies proves too difficult, the authorities may encourage invest-
ment in energy-saving technologies by subsidizing this investment as well, thereby offsetting
the disincentive to invest arising from the effects of the subsidies on energy prices for final
users.
Suppose, for example, that citizens investing in energy-saving technology benefit from
a proportional subsidy that reduces the cost of this investment per unit from c(a) to (1−
z)c(a). For a given (expected) level of energy subsidy, s, the optimal investment choice of
each citizen would thus be to set a equal to ξ(1−s) ≡ θ
(
(1−s)/(1−z)
)
= (c′)−1
(
(1−s)/(1−
z)
)
> θ(1 − s). Consider then the sequential choice of a given policymaker who selects a
level of abatement subsidy z at t = 0 and follows this by the choice of an energy subsidy
s at t = 1: it can be shown that, when the policymaker selects z optimally at t = 0, the
policymaker’s ex-post preferred level of energy subsidy coincides with her ex-ante preferred
level. Thus, in principle, the introduction of subsidies on energy-saving investments can
make commitment unnecessary (i.e., investment subsidies are just another way to commit).
In practice such subsidies may be difficult to target precisely: while energy subsidies
directly reduce the price of energy, abatement subsidies reduce the price of investments
that may be correlated only imperfectly with energy use and could thus leak beyond their
intended purpose, supporting investments that do not reduce energy consumption, or even
(perversely) encouraging energy consumption.
More importantly for the purpose of the present discussion, when there is political
competition among multiple potential candidates, the choice of subsidies on energy-saving
investments at t = 0 and the choice of energy subsidies at t = 1 may not necessarily be
made by the same policymakers, potentially generating incentives for strategic behavior on
the part of the incumbent(s). For instance, an incumbent could use the abatement subsidy
at t = 0 to condition the choice of energy subsidy of any candidate elected at t = 1 in
a way that ensures her own re-election: departing from her preferred level of abatement
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subsidy at t = 0, she could set it at a point that does not “accommodate” the energy
subsidy choice of any challenger likely to be elected, and, by so doing, ensure that the
voters would continue to elect her. So the use of subsidies for energy-saving investment
reshapes, but does not fully resolve, the problem of energy subsidy reform: the strategic
non-commitment problem with respect to energy subsidies may translate into a strategic
non-optimal abatement subsidy choice on the part of the incumbent, which in turn would
make the incumbent’s ex-post choice non-optimal.
Targeted transfers
When energy subsidies are justified primarily on redistributive concerns, their reform
may need to be accompanied by the introduction of alternative (and more efficient) mech-
anisms to achieve the same social objectives, such as the introduction of direct transfers
specifically targeted at the “energy-dependent poor”.
In our theoretical setup (where citizens have the same income but differ in their con-
sumption needs), this would be equivalent to ensuring that all citizens can achieve a mini-
mum level of disposable income net of energy costs. Let y > 0 be this level; in the absence
of subsidies (s = 0, implying p = 1), the required lump-sum transfer would be equal to
max
{
y − y
(
0, θ(1); i,m
)
, 0
}
≡ T (i,m), which depends on both i and m, i.e. it must be
“means tested”. Because of the informational constraints the government faces, this can
induce further distortions as it generates incentives for individuals to manipulate i and m
(which are not exogenous in reality) – a problem that has been extensively studied in the
public finance literature. To avoid such distortions, transfers must be conditioned only on
characteristics that are both verifiable and exogenous, e.g. calendar age;29 but this makes
the targeting very imprecise.
There are additional political-economy implications associated with such measures. If
the introduction of targeted transfers lowers the need for subsidies, then, for the reasons we
have already discussed, an incumbent may choose to forgo their use or set them at a low
level, retaining a role for a positive level of subsidies – and the discretion that is associated
with it – in order to secure re-election. Thus, targeted transfers may themselves be used
as a strategic tool of political competition.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed some political factors that can hinder the reform of
energy subsidies even when the latter would improve the welfare of most citizens by en-
couraging the adoption of energy-saving technologies.
29This is the approach adopted by the UK government, who grants lump-sum “Winter Fuel Payments”
to individuals aged 62 or above, irrespective of their income.
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We have shown first that a classical policy commitment problem arises when a conflict
between efficiency-related and distributional objectives is resolved ex post in favor of the
latter: once energy-saving techniques are adopted, motives to reduce energy subsidies as
initially announced are weakened, as doing so may hurt low-income or energy-dependent
households; since investors anticipate this outcome, any announcement that subsidies will
be reformed in the future is not sufficiently credible to encourage a desirable, but costly,
private investment in energy-saving techniques.
The issue is further complicated in a democratic environment where the policymakers
that select the current and future level of subsidies are also responsible for taking other
types of policy decisions. A credible commitment to reform energy subsidies (for instance,
by delegating price-setting authority to an independent committee with a limited policy
mandate) could remove a politically salient policy dimension from the political agenda,
thereby shifting the future electoral outcome in a direction unfavorable to the incumbent
policymaker. In this case, some – but not all – incumbents would be reluctant to commit
to reform; anticipating this behavior, voters could then choose to elect a less-preferred
candidate who is willing to commit (and thus encourage energy-saving investment), or to
elect their more preferred candidate even if the latter does not commit. In both cases, the
presence of a commitment problem shifts the political equilibrium away from the first best
toward a second-best outcome; in other words, if the commitment problem did not exist, a
majority of citizens would be better off.
Altogether, our analysis suggests that reforming energy subsidies may be difficult pre-
cisely because these subsidies are important to individuals and affect different individuals
differently – both characteristics that make them politically salient. The key conclusion
to be drawn from our analysis, however, is that a country’s ability to carry out policy re-
forms along specific dimensions, such as energy subsidies, could be enhanced through more
fundamental institutional reforms.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: Differentiating (5), substituting T ′ from (8) into the resulting
expression, and using the condition c′ = 1− s, we obtain∣∣∣∣dg
(
s, θ(1− s); i,m
)
ds
∣∣∣∣
s=sEP (i)
= −
ρ(i) sEP (i)
c′′
< 0, (11)
which, with the second-order curvature conditions for an optimum being satisfied, implies that
sA(i) – the value of s that makes dg
(
s, θ(1− s); i,m
)
/ds equal to zero – is less than sEP (i). 
Proof of Proposition 2:
I. To simplify notation, let gˆ(s; i) ≡ g
(
s, θ(1−s); i,m
)
. If there is commitment on the subsidy,
the outcome of the election is decided exclusively on the basis of preferences over policy
x, independently of the level at which s has been set. Then assumption (C1) in the text
(Section 3.2) implies that if there is policy commitment candidate B is elected. In turn
this means that if candidate B is the incumbent, she will always choose to commit to her
ex-ante favored level of s; by doing so, she will be re-elected and obtain her ideal policy
combination
(
s = sEA(iB), x = jB
)
.
II. If candidate A is the incumbent and she chooses to commit to her ex-ante favored level of
subsidy, sEA(iA), candidate B will be elected. In this case, if jA = jB, candidate A will also
obtain her ideal policy combination
(
s = sEA(iA), x = jA = jB
)
whereas by not committing
she will be elected and obtain, at best, a combination
(
s = sEP (iA), x = jA = jB
)
(if re-elected), which gives her a lower payoff. Thus, for every iA, there always exists
a neighborhood JA(jB; iA) to the left of jB such that, for jA ∈ JA(jB; iA), candidate
A will choose to commit, and for jA lying below jB but outside JA(jB; iA) candidate A
will choose not to commit if this can induce her re-election. Specifically, the difference
gˆ
(
sEA(iA); iA
)
− gˆ
(
sEP (iA); iA
)
equals zero for iA = 0 (where sEA(iA) = sEP (iA) = 0)
and is monotonically increasing in iA. As the difference h(jA; jA) − h
(
jB; jA) is zero for
jA = jB and monotonically increasing in the distance jB − jA (and thus decreasing in jA),
the locus of the indifference points u
(
sEP (iA), jA; iA, jA
)
− u
(
sEA(iA), jB; iA, jA
)
(which
we shall refer to hereafter as NN) will go through point (iA = 0, jA = jB) and will have
a negative slope in the (iA, jA) space, i.e. the size of the neighborhood JA(jB; iA) will be
zero at iA = 0 and will be increasing in iA.
Election outcomes under non-commitment can be characterized as follows. For iA = 1/2
and jA = jB, a majority of voters will support candidate A over candidate B (weakly so
if jB = 1/2); thus the locus of points where the voting support for the two candidates
is the same under non-commitment (which we shall refer to hereafter as V V ) crosses the
horizontal line jA = jB in the (iA, jA) space at a point where iA ≤ 1/2. Assumption (C3) in
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the text implies that for iA = 0 a majority of voters will support candidate A over candidate
B – which in turn implies that V V crosses the vertical line iA = 0 at a point where jA ≤ jB.
Since the locus NN goes through point (iA = 0, jA = jB) and is decreasing in iB and since
V V goes through points (iA = 0, jA ≤ jB) and (iA ≤ 1/2, jA = jB), by continuity the two
loci must cross, and therefore there must exist a region lying below and the left of locus NN
and above locus V V where non-commitment by candidate A guarantees her re-election and
candidate A prefers this outcome to the alternative of committing to her ex-ante favored
subsidy level and losing the election to candidate B.

Proof of Proposition 3: This proof proceeds in three parts. In the first part, we show that
the median voter is pivotal: she votes with the majority in any contest between two candidates
or two (infinite) sequences of policies. In the second part, we characterize how candidates’ equi-
librium strategies depend on the candidates’ types, identifying conditions under which one of the
candidates, once elected, refrains from committing with respect to s. In the third part, we prove
that voters keep re-electing candidate A, who does not constrain the value of s, if their discount
rate is sufficiently high.
Part I. First, we show that the median voter is pivotal. Notice first that the expected ex-ante
utility that a generic citizen of type (i, j) derives from a subsidy level equal to s is a linear function
of i: equation (5) can be re-written as
g(s; i) = A(s) + ωm+B(s) i, (12)
where
A(s) = (1− ω)m− T
(
F
(
s, θ(1− s)
))
−
(
c
(
θ(1− s)
)
+
(
1− θ(1− s)
)
(1− s)
)
ω (13)
and
B(s) = −
(
c
(
θ(1− s)
)
+
(
1− θ(1− s)
)
(1− s)
)
(1− ω) . (14)
In turn, the utility that a generic citizen of type (i, j) derives from a policy x on the second policy
dimension is a quadratic function of j. Rearranging (10), we obtain:
h(x; j) = C(x) +D(x) j − η j2, (15)
where C(x) = −ηx2 and D(x) = 2ηx. Hence, the instantaneous total expected utility that a
citizen of generic type (i, j) derives from a policy couple (s, x) is equal to
P (s, x) +B(s) i+D(x) j − ηj2 + ωm, (16)
where P (s, x) = A(s) + C(x). Consider now two infinite sequences of policies ΩA and ΩB, where
Ωh =
{
(sh1, xh1) , (sh2, xh2) , . . . , (sht, xht) , . . .
}
, h ∈ {A,B}, (17)
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where t, running from 1 to infinity, represents the time period. The discounted expected utility
that a generic citizens derives from each of these policy sequences is equal to
U (Ωh; i, j) =
∞∑
t=1
δt
(
P (sht, xht) +B(sht) i+D(xht) j − ηj
2 + ωm
)
= P (sh, xh) +B (sh) i+D (xh) j −
δ
1− δ
ηj2 +
δ
1− δ
ωm,
(18)
where P (sh, xh) =
∞∑
t=1
δtP (sht, xht), B(sh) =
∞∑
t=1
δtB(sht), and D(xh) =
∞∑
t=1
δtD(sht). Hence, a
generic citizen of type (i, j) prefers the policy sequence ΩA to the policy sequence ΩB if and only
if U(ΩA; i, j) > U(ΩB; i, j), i.e. if
P (sA, xA) +B(sA) i+D(xA) j > P (sB, xB) +B(sB) i+D(xB) j; (19)
and so if
D˜(xA, xB) j > −P˜ (sA, xA, sB, xB)− B˜(sA, sB) i, (20)
where D˜(xA, xB) = D(xA)−D(xB), P˜ (xA, sA, xB, sB) = P (xA, sA)−P (xB, sB), and B˜(sA, sB) =
B(sA)−B(sB). Hence, the boundary of the region of citizen types that prefer policy sequence A
to policy sequence B is a linear function of i and j; which implies (given that the citizens’ types
are uniformly distributed over a square) that the median voter (whose type lies at the center of
that square) always votes with the majority.
Part II. We now proceed to analyze the possible equilibria that can emerge when two candidates,
A and B, contest an infinite sequence of elections. Let iB < iA < 1/2 and jA < jB < 1/2 – so that
A is preferred by a majority along the s policy dimension and B is preferred along x. Assume
furthermore that the instantaneous utility uM (sAEP , xA) ≡ u(s
A
EP , xA; 1/2, 1/2) that the median
voter gets in one period if A is elected (with no previously set constraint on s) is greater than the
utility uM (sBEP , xB) ≡ u(s
B
EP , xB; 1/2, 1/2) that she would get if B were elected. Consider now
what happens if A is elected at the beginning of time (“period 0”). Note that candidate A would
not constrain the value of s in equilibrium. If she did, the voters could then elect candidate B
who could ensure her own re-election by constraining s at the same level while offering a policy
x that is preferred, by a majority, to xA. Hence, candidate A, once elected, does not set any
constraints on the value of s. What happens at the subsequent elections?
(a) If the voters elect B in period 1, it is because they expect B to set binding constraints
on s (otherwise they would re-elect A, whose unconstrained policies they prefer). In this
case, B could set s at a sufficiently high level (close enough, or equal to, the median voter’s
preferred ex-ante subsidy sMEA) to ensure her own indefinite re-election; since candidate B
would be unconstrained in period 1 on the s policy dimension, in that period she would
set s = sBEP . The corresponding median voter’s net present discounted utility (NPDU),
calculated in period 1, would then be equal to uM (sBEP , xB) + δV
M (B), where VM (B) =
uM (s1, xB) + δV
M (B) =
1
1− δ
uM (s1, xB).
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(b) If candidate B is elected in period 1, however, she could also set s at a level that is too
low to ensure her immediate re-election, inducing the citizens to elect A again in period 2
(and then B in period 3 and A again in period 4, and so on indefinitely). If this alternation
occurs in equilibrium, the median voter’s NPDU is equal to
VM (B,A) = uM (sBEP , xB) + δu
M (s2, xA) + δ
2VM (B,A)
=
1
1− δ2
uM (sBEP , xB) +
δ
1− δ2
uM (s2, xA).
(21)
(c) If the voters instead re-elect A (indefinitely), the median voter’s NPDU equals
VM (A) = uM (sAEP , xA) + δV
M (A) =
1
1− δ
uM (sAEP , xA). (22)
Hence the citizens prefer to alternate between the two candidates than to re-elect A all the time
if and only if VM
(
B,A
)
> VM (A), i.e. if
1
1 + δ
uM (sBEP , xB) +
δ
1 + δ
uM (s2, xA) > u
M (sAEP , xA). (23)
Notice that, since by assumption uM (sAEP , xA) > u
M (sBEP , xB), s2 must be larger than s
A
EP ;
candidate B would set s2 at the minimum level that satisfies the inequality in (23). In turn, from
period 2 onwards, the citizens prefer always re-electing candidate B than alternating between the
two candidates if and only if VM (B) ≥ VM (B,A), i.e. if
uM (s1, xB) ≥
1
1 + δ
uM (s2, xA) +
δ
1 + δ
uM (sBEP , xB). (24)
Candidate B would set s1 at the level that satisfies this constraint as an equality; since the median
voter prefers xB to xA, this level is lower than s2 but still larger than s
B
EP . Finally, from period
1 onwards, the voters prefer to re-elect B all the time than to re-elect A all the time if and only
if VM (B) ≥ VM (A), i.e. if uM (s1, xB) ≥ u
M (sAEP , xA). With s1 and s2 thus defined, candidate
B in period 1 has three choices: setting s equal to s1, setting s equal to s2, or imposing no
constraints on s and allowing candidate A to be elected in period 2 and then re-elected indefinitely.
She chooses the first alternative if VB(B) > max
{
VB(B,A), VB(A)
}
, the second alternative if
VB(B,A) > max
{
VB(B), VB(A)
}
, and the third if VB(A) > max
{
VB(B), VB(B,A)
}
, where
V B(.) denotes the NPDU in period 2 perceived by candidate B in each of these cases. Since
s1 < s2, V
B(B) is always greater than VB(B,A); hence, if uB(s1, xB) ≥ u
B(sAEP , xA) candidate B
is willing to be re-elected indefinitely, otherwise she prefers an equilibrium in which A is re-elected
indefinitely.
In summary, two equilibria are possible, one in which candidate A does not constrain the
value of s and is re-elected indefinitely, and the other in which candidate B, elected once, sets
s = s1 and is then re-elected indefinitely.
Part III. If uB(s1, xB) < u
B(sAEP , xA), proving that candidate A would not constrain s and
be re-elected in equilibrium is trivial: if she constrains s, she loses all subsequent elections to
25
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
candidate B, while if she leaves s unconstrained, candidate B will be unwilling to set s at a
level that enables her to win the election and Candidate A will be re-elected indefinitely. In this
case, provided that the preferences of the two candidates are sufficiently different, candidate A
obviously prefers not to commit to any level of s in order to be indefinitely re-elected. Consider
now the case where uB(s1, xB) ≥ u
B(sAEP , xA). Candidate A, again, leaves s unconstrained,
but candidate B is willing to set s sufficiently high to win all subsequent elections if she is
only once elected. In these conditions, the voters re-elect candidate A indefinitely if and only
if uM (sEPB , xB) + δV
M (B) < VM (A) = uM (sEPA , xA) + δV
M (A). Notice that, by assumption,
uM (sEPB , xB) < u
M (sEPA , xA) and V
M (B) > VM (A); hence, the voters re-elect candidate A if and
only if
δ <
uM (sAEP , xA)− u
M (sBEP , xB)
VM (B)− VM (A)
. (25)
That is to say, the citizens re-elect candidate A only if they discount future utility at a rate that
is sufficiently high to make them value the cost of “transitioning” from candidate A to candidate
B (having set s, for one period, at a level sBEP that is too low for most voters) more than the
benefits that will accrue, thereafter, as a result of the transition. 
Appendix B
Consider a model variant where energy consumption is proportional to income, and equal to
ψmi, and the distribution of the cost of the subsidy also depends on income, according to a
mapping T
(
F,m). Utility for an individual of type (i,m) is then
m− T
(
F (s, a),m
)
−
(
c(a) + (1− a)(1− s)
)
ψ im. (26)
The public funds required to finance a subsidy at rate s amount to
F (s, a) =
∫ 1
0
∫ m
m
s(1− a)ψ im dm di. (27)
The cost of the subsidy – which, as before, equals, F + F 2, is distributed through a linear
progressive tax whereby an individual with income m pays a tax tm−D, where D is a demogrant.
Equating F + F 2 with total tax revenues and solving for t, we obtain
T
(
F (s, a),m
)
= −D +m
(
2D
m+m
+
1
2
ψs (1− a) +
1
8
ψ2 s2 (1− a)2
(
m2 −m2
))
, (28)
which is increasing in m.
In the following, we focus on a parameterized scenario with ψ = 1/2, D = 1/5, m = 1, m = 3.
Assuming a social welfare weight ω = 1/2, and proceeding as in Section 2 to derive ex-post and
ex-ante preferred subsidy levels for an individual of type (i,m), we obtain
sEP (i,m) = max
{
1 +m(2i− 1)
2(1 +m)
, 0
}1/2
, (29)
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which is increasing in i and decreasing in m for 1 > i > (m− 1)/(2m) and is zero otherwise; and
sEA(i,m) = 0 ≤ sEP (i,m). (30)
The cumulative probability distribution for the ex-post preferred subsidy level – showing, for any
subsidy level, the proportion of individuals whose favored subsidy level lies at or below that level
– is shown in Figure 2.
This can be used to analyze strategic commitment choices along the lines we followed in
Section 3, leading to qualitatively analogous conclusions.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of the ex-post preferred subsidy level in the population of voters
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